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Abstract 
This  paper  analyzes  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  farm  income  stabilization 
program such as AgiStability in Canada. This program intends to mitigate farm income 
fluctuations, which is seemingly more neutral to the farming decision than the payments 
that are countercyclical with price or revenue, or that are commodity specific. However 
reduction of income variability generate responses in farmers’ risk management strategies, 
and most often generate crowding out effects of other strategies such as insurance or 
diversification.  Stochastic  analysis  of  risks  and  payments  is  combined  with  a  micro 
economic model of endogenous risk management decision under uncertainty to explore 
the  interactions  between  them.  The  part  of  the  program  that  is  triggered  with  small 
margin  reductions  of  15-30%  (frequent  normal  risk)  is  found  to  have  the  strongest 
crowding  out  effects;  the  most  catastrophic  part  of  the  payments  (when  margins  are 
negative) is paid too late for being an effective disaster assistance; the middle range part 
of  the  program  enters  in  competition  with  AgriInsurance,  the  subsidized  insurance 
program. In all, this program is a socially more acceptable form of supporting farmers, 




Optimum risk management strategy for the farmers depends on the risk environment that 
they are exposed to as well as risk market instruments and government policies in place. 
Existing literature finds a wide range of evidence. If the yield risk is higher other sources 
of risks, farmers are more interested in protecting yield risk, for example, through crop 
yield  insurance.  Empirical  research  finds  the  inverse  relationship  between  yield 
variability and use of price hedging (e.g., Miranda and Glauber, 1997). The correlation of 
risks  is  also  critically  important.  Coble  et.al.  (2000)  find  that  price  hedging  is  less 
attractive in the location with strongly negative price-yield correlation. Farmers are less 
interested in protecting price risk because the inverse relationship between price and yield 
already function as a natural stabilizer of revenue.  
Interactions exist between different risk management instruments. Both analytical model 
and  empirical  simulation  using  U.S.  data  show  that  price  hedging  and  crop  yield 
insurance are complementary (Coble et.al., 2000). If the yield risk is covered by the crop 
insurance  program,  farmers  are  more  interested  in  covering  price  risk  through  price 
hedging. On the other hand, since revenue insurance protects both price and yield risks, 
farmers enrol in revenue insurance program has less interest in protecting single source of 
risk through price hedging or crop yield insurance. Several studies show that revenue 
insurance has a substitution effect on hedging (Coble et.al., 2000; Wang et.al., 2004).    
Payments  that  are  triggered  when  an  individual  farmer  experiences  low  income 
(e.g. AgriStability in Canada) are more targeted to low income risk than fixed decoupled 
support or payments linked to any aggregate indicator or index such as revenue, price or 
yield at the regional or national level (e.g. ACRE and counter cyclical payment in the 
United States). However, these risk reducing policies significantly modify the distribution 
of revenue and income of the farm and therefore modify the whole production and risk 
management strategy of the farmer (OECD 2009). Turvey (2010) finds that Canada’s 
safety net programs (e.g., GRIP, CAIS and AgriInvest) have a significant effect on farm 
portfolio choice. If the farm income risk is protected by the government, the farmers 
reallocate  their  production  portfolio  to  pursue  higher  level  of  income,  taking  more 
income risk. The magnitude of this unintended effect of income stabilization programs is 
crucial in evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of such government programmes as 
a risk management measure. Diversification decisions often need to weigh the gains in 
terms of reduced profit variability with losses from reduced scale economies; the optimal 
scope and composition of the diversification portfolio is specific to each farm. 
However, the relationship between the degree of income risk coverage by the income 
stabilization payments and the crowding out effect of producer’s risk strategies is not 
clear in the existing literature. We adopt the simulation approach to analyze the initial 
impacts  of  Canada’s  AgriStability  program,  based  on  the  farm-level  data.  Stochastic 
analysis of risks and payments triggers is combined with a micro economic model of risk 
management decision under uncertainty to explore these interactions. 
This paper develops the technical modelling work in Antón et.al. (2011) and Kimura et.al. 
(2010).  Section  two  describes  the  policy  framework  in  Canada,  where  farm  income stabilization  is  the  central  objective  of  the  agricultural  policy.  Section  3  provides 
descriptive stochastic analysis of AgriStability program in Canada, considering the delay 
of  the  payment.  Section  4  develops  the  stochastic  simulation  model  assuming  the 
endogenous  choice  of  risk  management  strategy  by  the  farmer,  followed  by  the 
presentation of simulation results in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes and summarizes the 
lessons leaned from AgriStability program in Canada.   
2. Policy framework in Canada: Growing Forward 
Reducing risks faced by producers has been a central objective of Canadian agricultural 
policy for decades. Business risk management programs are also the center of the current 
growing forward framework developed in 2008. This is a multilayered system that targets 
to risks of all sizes and types using a number of programs whose joint effect is to provide 
relief for most of the risks faced by producers (Annex 1). AgriStability is a main program 
that provides support when a producer experiences more than 15% loss of margin relative 
to the olympic average of previous five years (reference margin), which replaced the 
former  Canadian  Agricultural  Income  Stabilization  Program  (CAIS).  AgriRecovery 
allows triggering ad hoc relief payments that respond quickly to a natural disaster event. 
In addition, the government provides public crop insurance program (AgriInsurance) as 
well as a saving account that allows famers to save up to 1.5% of annual net sale with 
matching payments from the government (AgriInvest).     
AgriStability is  composed of three layers according to  the magnitude  of margin  loss 
(Figure 1). The program payment covers 70% of the margin loss between 70 to 85% of 
the reference margin (Tier 2). This rate of compensation increases to 80% in the tier 
which covers between 0 to 70% of the reference margin (Tier 3). In addition to two tiers 
of payments, the government may cover 60% of the negative margin loss. Producers are 
expected to manage less than 15% of margin loss through saving account supported by 
AgriInvest (Tier 1).  
    Figure 1.  Structure of AgriStability payment  
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Source: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Payments under AgriStability typically come after two years or more after the producer 
experienced a margin loss. Participants file applications based on their income tax filings, 
which are typically made on the basis of cash accounting. This must be converted to 
accrual  by  the  agency  operating  the  program,  which  requires  collecting  additional 
information  from  farmers.  Further,  when  farm  enterprises  change  the  scale  of  their 
operation by more than 10% and CAD 5 000, their reference margin must be adjusted for 
this “structural change” in their operation. Therefore, to which extent AgriStability is 
stabilizing farm income is an empirical question.  
3. Descriptive stochastic analysis of AgriStability 
We analysed AgriStability payments and margins for 457 crop farms in Saskatchewan 
based on the longitudinal CAIS/AgriStability data between 1998 and 2008. One of the 
main advantages of using farm-level data in this study is that it contains the information 
on the income risk that is specific to the individual farmer. The simulation conducted one 
hundred  Monte-Carlo  draw  of  farm  revenue  and  variable  costs  based  on  the  joint 
empirical distribution of these variables generated for each farm. The current production 
margin  (PM)  is  defined  as  the  simulated  farm  revenue  less  variable  costs  and  the 
reference margin (RM) is calculated as an Olympic average of the last five draws of the 
Monte-Carlo  simulation.  AgriStability  payment  (g)  is  calculated  according  to  the 
specified formula.
2 In addition, indemnity from AgriInsurance is simulated based on the 
joint empirical distribution of farm revenue and crop insurance indemnity generated from 
the observed data. 
               0   if  RM PM * 85 . 0    (Tier 1) 
  g =         ) * 85 . 0 ( * 7 . 0 PM RM  , if  RM PM RM * 85 . 0 * 7 . 0   (Tier 2) 
                RM PM RM * 15 . 0 * 7 . 0 ) * 7 . 0 ( * 8 . 0   , if  RM PM * 7 . 0 0   (Tier 3) 
                RM RM PM * 7 . 0 * 8 . 0 * 15 . 0 * 7 . 0 * 6 . 0    , if  0  PM (Tier 4) 
Table 1 presents the simulation results. AgriStability can significantly reduce the farm 
income risk if it is paid within the same production year. The simulation shows that the 
payment reduced the variance of production margin for 96.3% of farms and by 44.1% on 
average. The minimum income also increases for more than 90% of farms. Much weaker 
reductions  in  variability  are  seen  when  different  assumptions  about  payment  lags  are 
introduced:  one  and  two  years  lag.  In  some  cases,  variability  can  increase,  with  the 
majority  of  farmers  not  seeing  the  variance  in  their  income  reduced.  Moreover,  the 
minimum income does not increase for the majority of farms if the payment is delayed 
for one or two years. The simulation exercise implies that, under these circumstances, 
AgriStability payments are unlikely to reduce the variability of income for most farmers. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  indemnity  of  crop  insurance  is  usually  paid  within  the  same 
production  year.  The  simulation  indicates  that  the  crop  insurance  reduces  the  farm 
income risk for 69.8% of farms and by 12.9% on average. The crop insurance program is 
more effective in reducing income risk than the AgriStability in the presence of payment 
delay. 
                                                 
2             We assumed that the program covers negative margin if two out of three PM calculated for RM 

















Production margin   22220 - - -
+ Indemnity from insurance 27310 -12.89 69.8 64.1
+ AgriStability payment without lag 26474 -44.14 96.3 90.2
+ AgriStability payment with one year lag 26471 0.32 45.7 42.0
+ AgriStability payment with two years lag 26468 0.95 43.5 40.0  
The  Mote-Carlo  simulation  of  AgriStability  indicates  that  the  delay  of  the  payment 
reduces its effectiveness in reducing farm income variability. However, the simulations in 
this  section  assumed  that  the  production  decisions  by  the  farmer  are  exogenous.  As 
Turvey (2010) points out, the Canada’s programs may affect the producer’s portfolio 
choice.  The  effectiveness  of  AgriStability  as  an  income  risk  management  policy  is 
reduced  even  further  if  it  crowds  out  the  use  of  other  risk  management  strategy  or 
instruments.  The  next  section  conducts  alternative  policy  simulation,  assuming  the 
endogenous decisions on production and risk management strategies.     
4. Stochastic simulation model with endogenous risk management strategies 
In  order  to  introduce  the  endogenous  risk  management  strategies  to  the  stochastic 
simulation  model,  the  model  hypothesizes  a  “reference”  producer  deciding  a  set  of 
available risk management strategies; acreage allocation across n crops, coverage of crop 
yield  insurance  (  )  at  the  planting  period.  The  model  assumes  that  the  producer 
maximizes the expected utility over the end-of-season wealth (w), which is a sum of an 
initial wealth ( 0 w ) and a net farm income in a crop year ( ). E() is the expectation 
operator,  U()  is  a  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function  that  represents  the  risk 
attitude of the producer. Net farm income includes the government transfer of payments 
(g) and the net receipt from crop insurance ( i CI ) in addition to the production margin.  
(1)  )] ( [ w U E Max , and     0 w w  
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where: 
      i p ~          uncertain output price of crop i 
      i q ~          uncertain yield of crop i 
      i L           area of land allocated to crop i   
    c ~           uncertain variable cost  
We  assumed  that  the  reference  producer  has  constant  relative  risk  aversion  with  the 
utility function as  (3) 
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) (
 
    w w U  
, where  is the Allow-Platt relative risk aversion coefficient. The complex structure of 
AgriStability  triggers  and  payments  and  the  expected  utility  function  maximization 
program advises for a numerical approach based on the simulated price, yield and cost 
distributions.  
Empirical distributions of aggregate and individual price and yield are generated based on 
the longitudinal farm-level data of 457 Saskatchewan crop farms in Canada, which is 
used in the simulation in the previous section. A reference farm is constructed as an 
average  farmer  in  the  sample  data,  and  calibrated  for  the  maximization  simulation 
exercise. This farm produces three major crops (wheat, barley and canola) under price, 
yield uncertainty in addition to the uncertainty in other crop revenue and variable cost. 
The initial wealth that is necessary to compute farm welfare is set as the average net 
worth of grain and oilseed farms in Saskatchewan in 2008 (1467 CAD per hectare). The 
farmer initially allocates 52.0% of land to wheat, 7.3% to barley, 2.1% to canola and the 
rest to other residual crop production. The variable cost in the data is not crop specific, 
but crop specific cost adjustment factors are calibrated so that the initial land allocation 
becomes the optimum. The model assumes that the reference farm is moderately risk 
averse with Allow-Platt relative risk aversion coefficient of 2. 
The government transfer of payments (g) includes three types of payments: AgriStability, 
AgriInvest  and  AgriRecovery.  AgriStability  is  modelled  according  to  the  specified 
formula used in the previous section.
3 AgriInvest is modelled as a lump sum transfer of 
1.35% of crop revenue. We modelled AgriRecovery in a reduced form to pay a fixed 
amount of payment in case the farmer experiences a systemic yield shock, in which the 
yields of all three crops fell below 30 percentile of the distribution.
4 The model is 
designed to estimate the impact of marginal changes and not suitable to estimate the full 
impact of all the programs. Therefore, the amount of  all three payments is reduced to a 
quarter of the calculated payments to avoid the corner solution. 
The net receipt from a stylized version of the crop insurance of crop  i ( i CI ) is paid in 
case the crop yield ( i q ~ ) turns out to be below 95% of the insured level of yield and the 
payment is determined by the area of land that the farmer insures ( Ii L ). To avoid moral 
hazard  and  adverse  selection  effects  (e.g.  increase  the  historical  yield  to  receive 
indemnities in the future), the model assumes the perfect insurance market so that risk 
neutral  insurance  companies  offer  crop  insurance  contact  at  the  price  equal  to  the 
expected  value  (fair  insurance  premium)  without  administrative  cost  and  government 
subsidy. A fixed forward price ( fi p ) and historical average yield of commodity ( hi q ) are 
applied  to  calculate  the  insurance  premium  and  indemnities.
6    represents  net  of 
                                                 
3               The simulation assumed that the reference farm is eligible for the negative margin coverage (Tier 
4) of the AgriStability. 
4   The expected payment of AgriR ecovery is set accordi ng to the estimated amount of ad hoc 
payments in the data.  T he ad-hoc program payment  is estimated as  a half of non -CAIS 
payments in the dataset. 
6   The forward price is set at 5% lower than the expected price. administration cost of insurance and subsidy to insurance premium.
7 The model calibrates 
  so that the reference farm insures a third of land in the absence of the government 
transfer of payments in place.    
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In order to model a farm producing multiple crops under price, yield, residual revenue 
and cost  uncertainty, the joint  distribution of prices  and  yields  of three major  crops, 
revenue  of  other  crops,  and  variable  costs  was  constructed  based  on  the  observed 
distributional  information  in  the  farm  level  data.  We  assumed  each  factor  to  be 
distributed normally, but with truncations at the extreme values observed in the data.  
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of the simulated joint distribution for the reference farm 
          (1) Mean, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, minimum and maximum 
Wheat Barley Canola Wheat Barley Canola
Mean 134.3 99.1 296.5 0.7 0.8 0.5 96.5 144.1
StDev 77.0 20.2 43.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 60.2 56.9
CV 57.3 20.4 14.7 29.1 18.1 24.2 62.4 39.5
Min 20.0 20.0 117.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 20.0
Max 380.0 215.0 445.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 750.0 800.0




Price (CAD per tonne)
 
          (2) Correlations 
Wheat Barley Canola Wheat Barley Canola
Price Wheat 1 0.59 0.66 -0.06 0.10 -0.05 0.24 0.33
Barley 1 0.34 -0.07 -0.16 -0.08 0.15 0.39
Canola 1 0.01 -0.10 0.03 0.24 0.08
Yield  Wheat 1 0.42 0.11 -0.08 -0.04
Barley 1 0.13 0.09 0.05
Canola 1 -0.07 0.03
1 0.33
Variable costs 1







Based  on  the  Monte -Carlo  draw  of  1000 price,  yield,  revenue  and  variable  cost 
combinations from the joint distribution, the model maximizes the expected utility with 
respect to area of land allocated to each crop and the level of insurance coverage. Since 
the specification of crop production is neutral to the farm size in this model, the reference 
farm is assumed to cultivate an average area of land in the sample data (820 hectare) and 
allocate land between available crops.  
 
 
                                                 
7   Under AgriInsurance, producers pay 40% of total premium  while the federal and provincial 
governments contribute the remaining premiums and fully cover the administrative cost.  5. Simulation results 
The simulation first added AgriInsurance, followed by the AgriInvest, AgriStability and 
AgriRecovery  programs  (Table  3).  The  welfare  change  of  the  risk  averse  farm  is 
computed by the certainty equivalent of net farm income, which can be decomposed to 
the contribution of change in mean and variability. The degree of crop diversification is 
represented by the coefficient of variation of market receipt per hectare. The initial value 
of  diversification  index  is  set  as  100  and  the  change  of  the  diversification  index  is 
expressed as  the  negative of the  percentage change in  the coefficient  of variation of 
market receipt. If the farmer uses less diversification strategy and specializes in a specific 
crop, the diversification index declines because the farmer allocates more land to crops 
that generate a higher return with higher variability.  
The programs in total reduce the coefficient of variation of income by 7.7 %, but almost 
entire welfare gain for the reference farm is due to the increase in the level of expected 
income, rather than to the reduction in the variability of income. However, the different 
programs  have  different  impacts  on  farm  welfare  and  the  risk  management  strategy. 
Unlike all the other programs, entire welfare effect of AgriInsurance is coming from the 
lower variability of farm income. It also has relatively large impact on minimum income 
level. On the other hand, the risk-reducing effect of crop insurance is partially offset by 
the crowding out of crop diversification strategies. The farmer responds by using crop 
yield insurance and producing more of the crop that that tends to generate higher returns 
with more variability. 
AgriStability and AgriInvest programs cover four different tiers: from the most frequent 
and  small  scale  risks,  to  the  most  catastrophic  risks  implying  negative  margins.  The 
AgriInvest program is designed to manage normal fluctuation of income by providing 
incentives to save. The simulation results show that this program has a minimum risk 
effect  and  purely  increases  the  level  of  income  without  crowding  out  other  risk 
management strategies: production diversification and the use of crop yield insurance.  
AgriStability  has  by  far  the  largest  welfare  impacts  among  the  four  programs.  The 
composition of the welfare impact shows that the farmer in the simulation values the 
program almost entirely as an income support rather than a risk reducing program. The 
coefficient of variation of income is reduced, but AgriStability has a strong crowding out 
effect  of  other  risk  management  strategies.  AgriStability  provides  support  when  the 
producer  experiences  a  margin  decline  of  more  than  15%.  Such  comprehensive  risk 
coverage  creates  an  incentive  for  farmers  to  specialize  in  riskier  crops  that  generate 
higher return. Moreover, AgriStability reduces the incentive to use crop insurance by half, 
as it already provides coverage for the same layers of income risk.  
Since the simulation is based on a static model, the farmer receives the payment from the 
AgriStability program simultaneously. However, the payment is likely to be delayed for 
one  to  two  years  as  we  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  Although  the  modelling 
structure does not allow the simulation of payment delay, a random noise to the payment 
is  introduced to  estimate the impact  of uncertainty in  payment.  The random  noise is 
calibrated for the reference farm based on the empirical distribution of the difference 
between the  case that  the payment  is  made without delay and one  year delay in  the simulation in Table 1. The simulation result shows that the AgriStability becomes less 
effective in reducing farm income risk, leading to smaller welfare gains. The crowding 
out effects of the program on diversification strategies is unchanged, while crowding out 
of crop yield insurance is slightly reduced. The noise in payments makes AgriStability 
less effective in covering income risks, which increase an incentive to use crop yield 
insurance. It may be the case that delays in the AgriStability payment indirectly creates a 
role for crop yield insurance that has an advantage of compensating yield loss rapidly.  
The simulation results show that AgriRecovery can have a very strong effect on crop 
specialization. When systemic yield risks are covered by the AgriRecovery program this, 
combined with the AgriStability program, provides greater incentive for the farmer to 
specialize  in  high-return  crops.  This  leads  to  higher  variability  of  income  and  lower 
minimum income before program payments. AgriRecovery increases income, offsetting 
the higher income variability. These simulation results suggest that the AgriRecovery 
program  is  not  effective  in  mitigating  catastrophic  income  risk  beyond  the  amount 
already provided by AgriStability. The farmer represented in the simulation benefits more 
from the income support component of the programs rather than the risk reduction they 
provide.  





Total impacts 5296.5 5250.1 46.3 -7.7 -30.0 12914.1 16.3
 contribution of….
AgriInsurance 10.8 -4.2 15.0 -0.5 -3.9 5424.2 33.1
AgriInvest 484.4 483.9 0.5 -0.7 0.0 479.6 0.0
AgriStability 3769.2 3634.2 135.1 -9.0 -17.8 12388.6 -16.6
AgriRecovery 1032.1 1136.3 -104.2 2.5 -8.3 -5378.4 -0.2
AgriStability 
with lag
3317.4 3285.4 32.0 -4.9 -17.8 11551.4 -16.2
Certainty equivalent income 























The additional simulation decomposed the impacts of three different tiers of AgriStability, 
assuming the payments are made without delay (Table 4). The simulation first introduced 
Tier 4 of the program and then Tiers 3 and 2 are added subsequently. The results in Table 
3 indicate that AgriStability as a whole reduces income risk but it may also have a strong 
crowding out effect of other risk management strategies. Table 4 shows that payments 
under Tier 2, the coverage of frequent and small margin loss between 15% and 30%, do 
not reduce the overall variability of income, as the payment leads to strong reductions in 
diversification. This effect also results in a lower minimum income. In the simulation, 
Tier  2  of  AgriStability  is  having  very  strong  negative  effects  on  farmers’ active risk 
management strategies and potentially increasing overall farm income risk.  
Payments under tier 3 are triggered for reductions in margin between 30% and 100% 
compared with the reference margin. This tier provides the largest payment to the farmers 
and is the most effective in reducing the variability of income. Payments under this tier also discourage diversification, but to a lesser extent than other tiers. Nevertheless, the 
welfare gain remains almost entirely due to the increase in the level of income rather than 
reductions of income risk. Tier 3 of the program covers a same layer of risk covered by 
the crop yield insurance, which explains why it reduces incentive to use it. 
Tier 4 is triggered in the case the farmer experiences negative margins. This tier most 
effectively  increases  minimum  income,  but  is  not  as  effective  in  reducing  income 
variability as Tier 3 as it promotes increased crop specialisation. Despite this effect, the 
variability of income remains almost unchanged because the farmer increases the use of 
crop yield insurance. This may be explained by some complementarities between the 
risks covered by Tier 4 of the program and crop yield insurance.  





Total impacts 3769.5 3728.9 40.6 -5.9 -31.9 8224.2 -5.4
 contribution of the coverage 
between 70-85% of 
reference margin (Tier 2)
335.4 418.5 -83.2 2.6 -6.8 -4887.7 -1.1
up to 70% of reference 
margin (Tier 3)
2488.1 2336.7 151.4 -8.6 -6.6 -2804.7 -21.3
of negative margin (Tier 4) 946.0 973.6 -27.7 0.1 -18.6 15916.6 17.0
Certainty equivalent income 






















6.  Conclusions  
This  paper  analyzes  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  farm  income  stabilization 
programs using AgiStability in Canada as an example. This program intends to reduce the 
farm income risk through providing support for farmers experiencing more than 15% of 
margin  loss.  However,  this  study  finds  that  Canada’s  AgriStability  faces  two  critical 
drawbacks: 1) the delay of payments significantly reduce the counter-cyclical nature of 
the program and 2) the program crowds-out other risk management strategies and allow 
farmer to take on more risk.  
The delay of payments is unavoidable in the program design that requires the government 
to capture the correct information on the individual margin loss through tax file. The 
delay is particularly problematic in case the government tries to assist farmers to manage 
disaster  risks, which requires  immediate response for quick recovery.  In Canada,  the 
existence  of  more  rapid  AgriRecovery  and  AgriInsurance  programs  enhance  this 
drawback of AgriStability. In this sense, counter-cyclical payments based on aggregate 
index is less targeted to farm income risk in its definition, but could be more effective in 
reducing farm income risk in practice if they can be paid quicker.  
We  also  learned  that  the  farm  income  stabilization  program  generates  crowding  out 
effects in other strategies such as insurance or diversification that are covering the same 
layers of risk as such program. This is a typical moral hazard problem that can only be 
resolved by ensuring that farmers continue to have an incentive to manage risks, such as 
through participation costs that are dependent on behaviour. However, this is technically 
difficult for any kind of insurance, and almost impossible for a programme like Canada’s AgriStability in which the farmer pays a fee that is only a small fraction of the actuarially 
fair premium (Schaufele et al. 2010). The simulations in this paper show that the part of 
the program that is triggered with small margin reductions of 15-30% (frequent normal 
risk) is found to have the strongest crowding out effects of diversification strategy. This 
implies  that  an  income  stabilization  payment  for  frequent  and  normal  fluctuation  of 
income is most likely ineffective. On the other hand, a fixed payment such as AgriInvest 
is found to have a minimum crowding out effect. This type of policy could help farmers 
to manage normal fluctuation of income more neutrally.   
Moreover, the simulation also indicates that the middle range part of the program enters 
in  competition  with  AgriInsurance, the subsidized insurance program.  The simulation 
exercise indicates that AgriStability could reduce incentives to use crop yield insurance. 
This is because these two programs cover the same layers of farm income risk.  The 
simulation also implies that the delay of the AgriStability payment may leave  incentives 
for farmers continuing to participate in crop insurance program.  
Income stabilization payments are often found to be more socially acceptable form of 
support to farmers than a fixed income support such as the single farm payments in EU. 
However, this study identifies such policy design face major challenges. Evidence of two 
major drawbacks  as  discussed in  this  section indicates income stabilization programs 
such as AgriStability in Canada are not likely to be an efficient risk management tool. An 
efficient risk management policy should  consider the impacts of policies on farmer’s 
endogenous  choice  and  give  the  farmers  the  responsibility  of  choosing  their  most 
efficient  risk management strategies.       
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